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. . ,lt is most ©specially in the conduct of foreign relations
that democratic governments appear to me to be decidedly
Inferior to governments carried on upon different principles.
.. .Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities
which e democTcicy possesses; and they require, on the con-
trary, the perfect use of almost all tiiose faculties in which
it is deficient. . .a democracy is unable to i-egulate the de-
tails of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design,
and to work out its execution in the presence of serious ob-
stacles. It cannot combine its measures v/ith secrecy, and
it will not await their consequences with patience, ^
Viable democratic government and effective foreign policy are
irreconcilable alms in the absolute, in the extreme, and in the ultimate
projection. Perfect visibility of a democratic government and perfect
efficacy of foreign policy are mutually exclusive aims since the prereq-
uisites of one are antithetical to the prerequisites of the other. The
jaroblem posed, however, is not considered to be taken in the dbsolute,
nor is it expected that a distinctly positi^^ or negative stand is desired,
R^ither, the question is believed to be d. springboard from which can be
launched an inquiry concerned with the relationship of effective foreign
policy to a visble democratic government. For the purposes of this in-
quiry, the writer will take the position thst a democratic government,
vls-s-vis other forms of government, has inherent disadvantages in the
fcxrmulation aiKi execution of effective foreign policy.
^Alexis d© Tocqueville , Democracy in America (London:
Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 160-161.
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At th« outset, the writer desires to mak© clear that he is a
staunch proponent of democracy as both a way of life dtnd a form of gov-
ernment and woiild not see eitiier Scicrificed to the <3itcr of efficiency or
effectiveness. His contention is that the founders of a democratic gov-
ernment are aware of its weaknesses in the field of international relations,
but choose to piece individual rights, liberties and freedoms in a para-
mount positicMi, sacrificing, if necessary, the government's potential
strength on the international level
,
As stated this study will be an inquiry into the relationship be-
tween a democratic government and effective foreign policy. It is beyond
the scope of the inquiry, and the writer's ak^lities, to recommend &
panacea for this dichotomous relationship.
In organization and methodology, this inquiry is divided into
three major sections. Tne first desls with the concept of democracy, its
raismi d'etre . types, principles, definition, &nd values. This, in turn,
is followed by a discussion of the American application of democratic
principles to its form of government. The second section is concerned
with foreign policy, its place within a government, its types, bases,
and purposes. American foreign policy is then examined with particular
emphasis upon its formulation. Thirdly, the American experience is
used to reveal the innate disadvantages of ^t democracy in formulating




Government is an instrument whereby the authority or
sovereignty of a group of people is represented and exercised throu^
@gencies and institutions for the formulation &n.d execution of th©
peoples' will. Within that grouping of people—^the state
—
government
is intended to protect members from each other ^nd from other groupings
of people. In attempting to do this, governments take many divers*
forms, from anarchy, or absence of government, to totelitarlenism, or
complete govemmentel control and hegemony over v^ll persons end ac-
tivities witiiin the state.
Aristotle classified government according to the number of
people who participated in its affairs and set fcath both good and perverted
governments. The good government of one-man rule is monarchy, the per-
version is tyranny; the good government of the rule of few is aristocracy,
the perversion, oligarchy; the good of the rule of the many is polity, the
perversion, mobocracy. His classification, while useful in the broadest
terms, is descriptive rather than andlytical, for all governments, in day-
to-day operation, «re of the few. h better means of classification would
appear to be one based upon the locstlon or distribution of sovereignty*
In anarchy, each individual retains his individual sovereignty. Under
totalitarianism, no Indivldueii retains sovereignty, bt^ the totalitarian
leader usurps the Individual sovereignty of all members of the state.
Between these extremes of the political spectrum would reside the diverse
jx srij




forms of government mentioned above. Democracy, however, cannot,
with validity, be placed in one location within the politicel spectrum,
for there ire widely divergent democratic theories t^n the location and
distribution of sovereignty. Witness the proliferation of "Modified"
democrecies existing today: Totaliterian Democrscy, Peoples* Democ3"acy,
Proletarian Democracy, Guided Democracy, Plebiscitary Democracy,
Bourgeoisie Democracy, ^^thenian Democracy, Social Democracy, P^ire
Democracy, and Direct Democracy to name a few.
Thus democracy means raany things to many people ^'ncv^ is vir-
tually subject to individual interpretation as to its "reeT meaning.
Further, it Is frequently used in connotations whlc*i transcend the politi-
cal realm, such as, "democratic way of life," etc. When thus used,
it assumes cHi enK>tional mantle that defies description ot classification.
Notwithstanding its extrapolitical connotations, there are cer-
tain chanjcteristlcs or principles of democracy which are almost univer-
sally valid (absolute universally-valid principles would be so all-
encomp.:iSsing that their value in any investigation would be useless).
Perhaps the first principle should be majority rule, and its attendant
mincarity protection. Normally the decision of the mcijority is reflected
tlirough representatives and implies the consultation and consent of the
majority of the electorate.
Secorjdly, the political status of 2,11 members of the state, with
reference to their voting equality, is generally considered en intrinsic
principle of democracy. The franchise is equally distributed without
regard to race, color, creed, wealth, soclsl position, or education





exercise of a porticm of an individuai*s sovereignty, can give expression
to his will.
Herein lies a third characteristic of most democracies ^tid that is
direct popular control over policy-makers et\d. their actions, by periodic
elections, and Indirect control, through representation, normally exercised
through the Institution and position of a legislature. One writer on this
subject has said:
The difference between an authoritarian and a democratic
state centers on the position of the representative body.
If tlie Legislature is free and strong, authcritsrlan rule
cannot exist. Witiiout it, there can be no democratic
government* Subject only to the sovereign people, the
Legislature must have the ultimate power in a democracy.
2
A fourth principle of democracies emanates from the relationship
between the people and the policy-mskers and is that the individual must
have the political freedom to exercise effectively his collective control
over policy-mskers by mesns of organization, usually in the fonis of politi-
cal parties and political communications
.
One further characteristic of a democrscy which bears mention
is that sll actions within the state, from the expression of majority role
to the maintenance of internal order, are designed to be peaceable B.nd
to 5void violence.
These fh^e chsrscteristics or principles, then, constitute a
description of most democracies and provide & basis from which a viable
definition of s democratic government may be derived. Xiie writer of this
essay is unable to Improve upon thet rendered by H.B, Mayo who states:
2Riomas K. Finletter, Can Representative Govemnient Do The
lob ? {New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1945), p. 13.
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6A democratic political system is one in which public policies
are mide, on a majority basis, by representatives subject to
effective control at periodic elections which are conducted on
the principle of pcdltical equality and under conditions of
political freedora , ^
From the principles which serve as the basis for the above defini-
tion flow certain values which are characteristic of a democracy. From
the j«inciple of avoidance of violence come the values of peaceful change
and the voluntary settlement of disputes through a minimum of coercion
and force, FrcHa these and from the principle of popular control over
poiicy-Tnakers comes the veslue of the orderly ©nd peaceful succession of
leaders. Further, from the principles of political equsUty and freedom
come on© of the core values of a democracy: Justice must be applied
equally to even the most pluralistic groupings within the state.
these principles and values, taken together, delimit the general,
all-encompassing meaning of the term "democrgicy'* bM begin to narrow
its interpretation to an Anglo-Saxon conception. However, because the
term is still so amorphous, erne must furtiier limit its connotations and
choose a political moment and location in time in carder to investigate its
cc^positicm and institutions. As his democratic plane of reference, the
writer chooses the American experience with democratic government.
American democracy has historically been characterized by two
major pollticol devices, majority rule and civil rights. Majority rule hes
already been mentioned. Civil rights, as used by the writer, embrace
those individual rights which require protection from encroachment by
both the government Itself and by other individuals within the state. The
%,B. Mayo, Ag Introduction to Democratic Theory'- (New York:
Oxfc3ard University Press, 1960), p. 70,
fTT'
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basic American civil rights are delineated in« but not limited to, the
Bill of Rights and amendments xm, XIV, and XV of the United States
Const!tuticm. Democratic thought in America has primarily concerned it-
self with two internal political relationships: that of the individual to
tiie State and cd individuals to one another. External relationships and
security were presumed guaranteed by insulaar isolation, the ?ejx. Britannic
e
^
and weak continental neighbcrs.
The Founding Fathers considered that individuals could be ade-
quately protected from one another by the mere existence of government,
legislation, and law enforcement, llielr primary concern centered on the
relationship betv#een the individual and tiie State and they championed the
pararaountcy of the Individual. In order to protect his freedoms, they
purposely limited the powers of govemmenti
It was with this purpose in mind ^at the American Constitution
divided authcsrlty between the States end the Federal Government,
and within the latter, among executive, legislative, and Judicial
branches. Federalism and the separation of powers were de-
liberately designed to keep all governments—and especially the
National Government—weak. '^
Thus from the birth of the American democratic experience, in-
stitutional safeguards were adopted in order to restrain the powers of
government and protect individual rights , In addition to the separauon
of powers and checks dnd balances mentioned above, the framers of the
Constitution entrusted specific powers to the Federal government with
tiie stipuldtlCMi that all reserved powers belonged to tiie individual st'^tes
and their inhabitants.
%ohn W , Spenier, American Foreign Policy Since Vvorld War l^
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961), pp, 4-5^
(.-'ri^-Sri'Viv* hni'. A=?'
I+'-i^ ; t';i -','>. i'-t •.• ti- tfJ' i-.f J
'0«ft




A« a result of these institutional safeguards, an American
Federal government emerged which was structurally unique in the world,
Federdlism divided powers between the states and t^e central govern-
ment, Within the Federal government, powers were further divided among
tlie Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary, with a system of checks and
beiences that was intended to preclude the ascendancy of one branch to
a tyrannical position. Further, although the President alone heads the
executive branch and represents its power, both the legislative and
Judicial brandies contain their own systems of checks and balances*
the Legislature is denied unanimity by its Mcameralism Sitid by the interplay
of political parties, interest groups, sectional interests, and public opin-
ion. In the Judiciary, perfect unity is discouraged by the plurality -and
diversity of the Supreme Court Members.
Having briefly discussed the institutional structure of the Ameri-
can democratic government, the writer will proceed to inquire as to the
specific powers, iind divisions of power, among the branches.
As previously mentioned, the American states are entrusted with
the reserved powers not specifically given to tiie central government. In
addition, by the Constitution, the fights &nd immunities of citizens oi
each state sre protected from encroachment by other states , New states
Mit«ring the United States have equal rights with older stftei? and each
Stat© is guaranteed a republican form of government.
^e Constitution allocated to the Federal government, in
general, only those powers which were thought to be necessary for the
accomplishment of objectives transcending the abilities of states individ-
ually or collectively. These specific powers are presented in tihe dis-
,>r!ifrjB'
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mission of th© Federal branches having responsibility for their Impleinent©-
tlon. However, before leaving the general treatment of the National gov-
ernment, <xy& must distinguish between Constitutional atj^earance and
reality. In practice, there h^s been a grsdusl accretion of powers in the
central government, ©specially within the executive branch, that was riot
intended by the Constitution, which expected the Legislature to be the
supreme br€in<:^
,
Hne Constitution established a bicameral Legislature with a
Senate for geographical representation and s House of Representatives
equally apportioned according to population. Ml legislative powers of
the Federal government are vested, Jointly between the two houses, in
Cc«igress, ^inrsong the most impoftsnt powers conferred upon Congress are
those of taxation, the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, the
coinijge of money, the declaration of war, the appropriation of monies,
and, exclusively to the Senate, the ratification and approval of trestles
^>.nd appointments. More than any oth«r branch, the Legislature, and par-
ticularly the House of Rep^esentstives, reflects the desires or discontent
of the body politic, <^nd public opinton, whether collective, sectional, oc
particular
.
the executive branch is headed by a popularly-elected President
who Is the sole responsible constitutional officer. He is aided in the
execution of his ^wers by a popularly-elected Vice-President and by
appointed heads oi executive departments. Constitutionally, the foUovv-
Ing niQjor powers, both executive &nd federative, are conferred upon him:
He shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; by a^nd wltii the






ambassadors, judges of the Suprcsme Court, and other officers of tiie
United States; he shall receive ambassadors; and ". . ,tske car© that the
Laws be faithfuily executed. . , ."^ As mentioned, however, there has
been «s gradual accretion of power within the executive branch of govern-
ment that has come ^bout as a result of usage and Interpretation. From
his Commander-in-Chief powers, the Executive has derived the power to
commit the nation publicly to specified policies and courses of dctlon.
From his treaty powers, the President has derived the power to conclude
executive agreements. From his power to receive ambassadors and diplo-
matic representatives, the Executive has derived the power of recognition.
And, from his powers to see that laws am faithluUy executed, the Presi-
dent has derived wide emergency powers, appUcisble both domestically
and externally. The executive branch comes closest to representing unity
and cohesiveness among the three Federal branches.
l!he Constitution established a Judiciary as an independent and
co-equal branch of the Federal government, coraposed of a Supreme Covat
and such Inferior courts as should be established by Congress. The most
impcatant power entrusted to the judicial brsnch is one of those least
used: that the Supreme Court has the right to Judge the validity of acts
of the other Ixanches of government. The Judiciary is a legalistic guaran-
tor of individual democratic rights and the system of separation of powers
and checks and balances •
These, then, are the theoretical and Institutional bases of
Amerlcsn democracy. In order to preserve the future existence of










udemocratic prindlpiss and values within th® United States and to permit
their growth and development, the writer believes that the Legislature,
with its diverse influences and considerations , should retain an equal
position with the Executive in the formulation and execution of domestic
objectives and policies. This is best accomplished and guaranteed by
the continued reliance upon checks and balances as protection against
Exec^itive omnipotence dnd tyranny. Only through diffusion of authority
and pluralistic representation can viable democratic government be ensured.
:/9n«7 -^^ jitzniit






Each state h^is principles end values which it wishes to protect
and promote. These can be as unsophisticated as the basic raison d'etgt
or th©y can involve complex ideologicel dogma based upon the sociol,
economic, B.ad political ideas of a society, upon s unique interpretation
of history, a set of aims or objectives, car a standard of conduct and
national behavior. Regardless of their scope, there exist principles which
underlie the actions of every state
.
In addition to tliese underlying principles, each state possesses
interests which itconsiders paramount. A stcite's basic interest is for
self-preservation and well-being and this situation would remain valid
even if the state were in a perfect vacuum* Since, however, no state is
isolated from the effects of the existence of other states, additional in-
terests come into prominence. Each state, as well as pursuing internal
interests, is concerned with the maintenance of its security and, as an
outgrowth, the maintenance of International stability. Ihese National
Interests are defined as "The general and continuilng ends far which a
nation acts,"^ Whereas the form la which these National Interesi;s are
stated are constantly ch^anging, they themselves remain as constants,
with principles, underlying all actions taken by the state. Actions taken
to support the i*Jational Interests fall into two categories: those which
take place tntorn^ily and those which transcend the domestic arena and
^Th@ Brookings Institution, Maica- P.oblems of United States













transpire externally or Internationally. This essay is concerned primarily
with the latter, within which context the term will be used.
It is significant to note that all states* National Interests differ
since they are independently ccmditloned by Indigenous political, social,
economic, intellectual, religious, and geographic influences . Farther,
they ere uniquely c^iditioned by divergent principles, or sources of action.
Whenever the National Interests of s state are confronted or
challenged and move from the universal to the precise and assume a parti-
cular form they become objectives* Objectives, therefore, are interests
particularised to me«t specific international situations, to challenge or
cc»nplement the jMationil Interests of other states
.
In order to Implement objectives, states must devise and pursue
specific courses of ection, called policies. Policies, in general, sre
courses of action to secure objectives which protect or promote the
National Interests. Foreign policies are t^jose courses of action designed
to have impact or effect in the international arena, in interplay with the
courses of action of other states seeking to obtain objectives to further
tiieir own National Interests •
One further definition is desirable before proceeding to an in-
quiry concerned with foreign policy. Whereas policies are specific
courses of action, commitments are specific undertakings In suppcMrt of
those policies.
As an Illustration to demonstrate the vsiidity of these defini-
tions , let us apply them to the present situation in Laos , The President
of the United States views further Communist expansion as fe tiireat
to our security and well-being, our Naticmal Interests. He, therefore.
zt
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decidea to particularize those interests by making it an American objective
to check further Communist expansion. The policy pursued to attain this
objective is to provide aid and assistance to those countries outside of
the Communist bloc and the commitments undertaken in support of this
policy include sending military advisors an^ equipment to Laos and the
U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam. However, the President wes not
without restraints on the action th it he might have taken, far our Ameri-
can principles dictate that National Interests, and the actions taken to
protect or promote them, must be within the framework of International
Law,
the above example, ami particularly the restraining effect of
principles on action undertaken in defense of the National Interests,
provides the springboard from which an inquiry on foreign policy can be
launched.
It appears to this writer that all human actions are conditioned
by one's concept of the nature of man. Admittedly, this may appear to be
an oversimplification, but the v/riter contends that its validity and
viability are apparent in the theory of international relations isnd can be
adequately traced to the principles which underlie the sctions of every
state. One can consider the nature of man as being either intrinsically good
or innately "evil" atid power-seeking. It is considered that this division
forms the basis for the two schools of theory concerned wi\h intern^tiondl
relations and states' actions in support of their Nstional Interests. Those
who support the "goodness" of man believe in a hsrniony of interests emong
states; tliose who believe that men is Intrinsically pov/er-seeking contend
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Before continuing, it should be made clear that th« writer in*
tends to generalize in support of his position and that the generalizations
expounded will be subject to many exceptions. Generally speaking, how-
ever, those who believe in s harmony of interests among states usually
associate themselves with the loUc^ving concepts of international relations:
Idealism; pesceful cooperation; Internationalism; World Peace; Legalism;
Interna tioncsl Morclity; <r*nd Utopl3nism. While those who preach the in-
evitability of conflict among states frequently associ^Jte themselves with:
Re&lism, E^lance of Power policies; NB>tlonaUsm; power as the sole
guarantCMT of a state's continued existence; Pragmatic Moralism among ;Kit&tes;
and Pragmatism*
Admittedly also, these two pure poles of theoretical difference
are not epitomised by any extant state, H ther, they constitute the limits of
a conceptual spectrum on which, at various locations, the principles under-
lying a state's international objectives, policies, and commitments are
found.
As an illustration in supped of this theory, the writer contends
that ^e forf^tgn policies of Hitler's Germany were relatively close to tne
conflict pole while those of Wilson's America approached the harmony pole.
In ectuality, oi course, a state's fcnreign policies are corKlitioned by princi-
ples which reflect ever—changing combinations of theories of both pur©
pieces and these combinations are so myriad that no two states have identi-
cal foreign policies, objectives, or commitments. Thfrefom, in order to
conduct an inquiry concerning foreign policy, one must, again, select a
plane of reference, an internationsl relations point and place in time.
The writer chooses to examine American fc»relgn policy as the sul^ect of
-r.i ifttnw eri'
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his inquiry. Contemporary American foreign policy can be broadly des-
cribed aa resulting from both external and internal factors and stimuli
«
operating within the frameworic of International I*iw and accepted diplo-
matic practices, disdaining force and power whenever possible, and de-
signed to implement the objectives of International Peace and cooperation
amofig netions. American foreign policies combine, then, the concepts
of Realism and Idealism, Power and Peace,and Nationalism and Internation-
alism.
Any combination of concepts, however, is constantly changing
and the contemporary one only emerged after 1947, Prior to that time, as
a brief resume of history will show, the United States emphssized differ-
ent concepts which underlay the principles which conditioned its foreign
policies. The first was based upon Realism, Nationalistic Idealism, and
a rejection of power, and manifested itself in the form of isolationism.
This manifestation has, to the present, been an undercurrent of American
principles and, at various times, when ttie interests of the country
turned inward, has come to tiie fore as a prlm.3ry concept relating the
UrUted Stetes to the external world. Its first major emergence was during
the period of Reconstruction, Western settlement, and industrial develop-
ment from 1865 to 1890. Its second was during both the period of retreat
from responsibility and economic catastrophe from 1919 to 1937, epitomised
by the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Vorsaiiies, the Depression, &ad
the embargo and neutrality legislation of the 1930's.
P second concept was that of the Bahtnce of Power, which has
been ^n undulating concept, ascending to pre-eminence only when
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appeared in 1778 in the form of a Tt®'sty of AlUanee with France; during
the Civil War, in e negative sense, to prevent a New World Balance of
Power between the Confederacy and European states; in Latin America
until the Good Neighbor era; in Asia with the Open Door policy; to a cer-
tain degree, preceding .American entry into the two V/orld Wars; and from
1945-1947.
A third concept wes that based upon the use of power as a means
for territorial, political, and economic expansion, Fiorther, in a negative
sense, it was the use of power to prevent the expansion of European states
into areas of American interests. This reliance upon power played a vital
role in conditioning American foreign policies. The War of 1812, fought by
the United States for the incompatible purposes of "Peace and Profits",
was based upon an assertion of Freedom of the Seas, the American right to
trade, and American territcHriel expansion. Furtlier, the acquisition of Texas,
CalifomiB, snd Oregon, under the guise of Manifest Destiny, waa territori-
al and political expansion through power, as was the acquisition of Cubs,
Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines by "Mew" Manifest Destiny after
the Spanish-American Wer, Taft*.s Dollar Diplomecy in the Caribbean was an
American demonstration of power and, in a negative sense, both the Monroe
Doctrine and the Roosevelt corollary thereto constituted the use of power
to deny the Western hemisphere to Europeon states.
Idealism, coupled with moraiism and legalism, comprised the
final major concept underlying American principles . The indigenous form
which it took was 3 result of isolationism and was based upon the repudi-
ation of Eiux?pe:m power politics, the belief that democracy was synonymous
with peace, that harmonious p»o-%c® was the "ntitJiesis of power politics.
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end th®t it w^s America's destiny to spread its kind of freedom and liberty
to «U mankind. This concept of /"merlcan moral superiority over Europe
wos first expressed in the Monroe Doctrine and later became the purported
rationalization for the Spanish-American War. In the form of Christian
siorality coupled with American democracy, it tecame President Wilson's
motivating force. It was the clarion call for United States' entry into both
World Wars and manifested itself in the League of Nations, the Kelicg-
Bris^nd Poet, and in America's intransigent position of basing recognition
upon de iure factors '^.lone.
Since 1947, and the ©mergence into what the writer chooses to
cell "Intern itiondUsm", the Unitjed Stfttes h^s foresken the concept of
Isolationism, watered down that of Nationalistic Idec^lism ^nd he s rejected
power as e means for territorial expansionism. Tlie United States has sub-
stituted therefor new theories which emphssize internation J cooperation,
wcwld peace, and collective security, in oraer to define objectives and de-
vise and implement policies which protect ^.tid promote the National Interests
In an ever-chenglng international milieu.
Here, then, are the diverse forms thst one state's objectives and
foreign policies may assume in less than two hundred years. Whether they
entail politic ij^l, social, territorial, military, or economic complexions, or
combin<.'tlons thereof, and regardless of their success or failure, they are
designed to enhance the National Interests
,
These ©re the types, purposes, and theoretical bases of American
foreign policies . One must now proceed to nn investigation concerned with









;»» f- '•.«^ ?
V J ' ' '}•
u-f .»K '; V *vfj» a;: r '5*:
8S^
1$
The essence of th© conduct of foreign i-ffjlrs Is the regulation of the
numerous phases of the relationships between this nation and other
n tions. The fr^tmework within which this process takes f>Lice com-
I»rise8 th« relevant provisions of the Constitution as they have been
Interpreted smi ^^pplled through statutes, executive orders, ??dminis-
tratlve rules. Judicial decisions, treaties and other international agree-
ments, and prectices based on precedent. The framework has two basic
features: the supremacy oi the federal government in the conduct of
foreign rel^ttions, and the separation of powers in the three branches
of the federal government itself.^
Foreign affairs is its-elf divided into two aspects: foreign policy
formulation and foreign policy execution. This ess ly is concerned pri-
marily with the former, but will include the Icitter.
Generally speaking, "mericsn foreign policy, &s h;js haen men-
tioned, is formulated with respect to both external and internal, foimal
and informal f-sctors.
Formal extern^.! factors include Internationa i Law, tree ties entered
into with other stf^tes, alliances, collective security and coUC'.trve defense
commitments, and the like. Informs! external factors include the factions
and behaviOT of v'jII other states, an amorphous "universal standard of mor-
ality", wcarld public opinion, and commonly-accepted diplomatic practices,
tradition, and customs. Whereas the formisl fdctcwrs, and diplomatic prac-
tices, are relatively constant and unchanging, the inform^*! factors are ex-
tremely voktile end ciiprici us. The vicissitudes of the informel factors
tend to impart an indefinite ever-changing qurality to American foreign policy,
The reason for this is ^at few, if any, deliberstions take place thst are
not affected by external factcsrs in the course of foreign policy formulation
,
In many ways, these external factors, especially those wHich bt^, formal.
7The Brookings Iiistitution, Governmental Mechrmism lor the Con-
di4ct of Unitad States Foreiin f<el^nons . t'^^^saiaafcoirj. r,,C.; Brookings




become th© principles which underlie United States' actions.
Formc\l internal factors ire a most relevant portion of any discus-
sion concerned with the factors which ffect the formulation of American
foreign policy. The paramount formal internal factor is the United States
Constitution, which stipulates that the Federal government will be hegemonic
in the field of fcareign rel itlons and th «t, generally, the powers of the
National government will be »ep-zirated into three fc«-anches.
In regard to the first stipulation, th© Constitution specifically
denies the states any independent authority or powers in the conduct of
foreign affairs. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Con-
federation;. . .No State shrilly without the Consent of Congress, . . .enter
into '^ny Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power,
..." Thus, in relations with other nations, the Federal government is,
formally, the only voice expressing United States sovereignty.
In regard to the second stipulation, that of the separation of powers
within the Federal government, the Constitution provides a paucity of
direction in the field of foreign affairs. The authority of the Judiciary extends
to L.w cases: Involving treaties; affecting ambassa-dors and other American
diplomatic officers; involving admiralty ^nd mirltime furisdlction; and
arising between states or indivldue^ls ?in<5. foreign states or individuals.
Direction concerned with Executive authority in foreign ?Afiiirs is
limited to designating the President to be Comm«inder-in~Chi€f of the Armed
Forces and to make treities and appoint ambassadors and other public
officers, by and with the -advice and consent of the Senate. Addition-illy,
^U.S. Constitution, I, Sec, 10, cl, 1, 3.
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the Piesident is designated to receive amhissadors and other diplomatic
officers and to ensure that the liws of the United States are faithfully
executed* Lastly, he may, from time-to-time , recommend to the Leglsia-
ture action that he considers necessary.
The Legislature is empowered to: borrow money in behalf of the
United Statea; regulate foreign commerce; establish nstureilization regul-^-
tlons; regulate the value of foreign currency; define and punish certein
offenders of Intem-stional Law; Impose and collect taxes and duties to
provide for the defense and welfare of the United States; ^nd "To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for ceiTylng into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
9
the Government of the United States . . . .
"
Addltionii formal Internal factors include statutes, administra-
tive regulations, executive orders, and judicial decisions. These, how-
ever, through time, tend to encompass. Include, and reflect the informal
internal factors of custom, precedent, and public opinion. Therefore, in
order to preclude in historical investigation of minutiae in the process of
becoming statutory, the Influence of formal, less Constitutional, i^nd in-
formal factors will be jointly handled, Iheir influence has had three major
effects upon the formulation of American foreign policy, which brine about
=3 divergence from the framework Intended by the Constitution. The first
is thdt the Judlelary play© virtually no role in foreign policy, so that the
resulting separation of powers has become a bileteral division between the
Executive snd the Legislature, The second Is that between the Exeuwtive
9 ~
ibiCs , I, sec. 8, cl. 18,
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and the Legisl'^ture there has been an adulteration of functions to the
point that the Executive occasionally legislates and the Legislature
initiutes. Further, areas of joint or co-jurisdictional influence h ive emerged*
Tliirdly, as previously stated, there has been an unintended accretion of
power in the executive branch.
Therefore, ds a result of the effects of both formal and infcarnal
internal factors , the extant governmental framework for the formulation of
foreign policy appears very different from that intended by tlie Constitution.
In addition to those powers conferred upon it by the Constitution,
the Executive has accrued powers as a result of both external and internal
factors . These powers operate in three indistinct realms of Presidential
hegemony! the President as the National Leader (Executive powers); the
President as the external representative of American sovereignty (Federative
powers); end the President as the Party Leader (Political powers). J^ctlons
and decisions teken by the President in the field of foreign relations are
often 3 combination of these three powers, which makes difficult any
attempt to separate and identify them.
Thus, in addition to his Constitutional powers, the President wields
both traditional and emergency powers. His traditional powers in foreign re-
lations include his right to make e^^cutive agreements with the heads of
other states. Executive agreements ^re divided into three types: First,
those made by the President without prior Congressional consultation or
concurrence, such as the Yalta Agreement; second, those made by the
President based upon both prior Congressional concurrence and prior
United States law, such as reciprocal trjde agreements; and third, those
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until Implemented by Congress, such as the United Nations Participation
Act of 1945,
?^ further traditional power of the President is his authority to ex-
tend recognition or sever cIlplom?itic relctlons, both of which grew out of
his Constitution I power to receive and rppolnt jmbessadors. The
appointive power, of course, requires the ;dvlce and consent of the Senate,
Since constitutionally the President was chiitged with primary
responsibility In the field of foreign relations snd since Informotion was
necessary for policy formulation t>nd execution, the executive branch has
enjoyed s virtual monopoly in the collection and e\^luation of intelligence.
Further, since the President must consider the merit of keeping both the
intelligence and Its sources classified, he exercises discretiomry powers
in its release to the public. It should be noted, however, thet this power
is often challenged by the Legislature,
&s a result of trsdition Z'nd of the ^xpjnsion of communication media,
the Executive has accmed what might aptly be termc-d "Public Rel^^tions
Powers." Itils amounts tohia use of press conferences, "fireside chats,"
Bxid briefings to Influence or mold public opinion In support of his decisions
or vctions.
The President as the piirty leader wields political piDWers which,
historically, h tve been manifested through patronage, "pork-bcirrelling," and
his potential "endc-sement" of Congressional candidates in elections.
From his Federative F-.Tid Comm'-^inder-in-Chief powers, the Executive,
as has been stated, can publicly commit the United St^-tes to specified poli-
cies that virtually preclude Congressional repudl=^tion, Ex^'smples of tliis




Kennedy's cictlon in establishing a niivol blockade of Cuba.
The President also has certain legislative powers, for many of the
legislative enactments in the field of foreign policy have had their origin,
direction, and framing within the executive branch of the government. The
Greek-Turkish fid Program and the Point Four Program are examples of this
Executive power.
In addition to these povi^ers accruing to the Chief Executive cis a
result of custom* tmdition, and usage, there are olso wide emergency
powers which heve been bestowed upon him. National crises have called
for the expansion &nd exercise of Executive powers to the point th- 1 one
writer on the suli^ect claims thot during time of w^ir the President exercises
1
almost monarchical authority in foreign relations, "
These, then, are the extra-Constitutional powers which reside in
the hands of the Executive and which help to describe the extant governmental
framework for the formulation of American fcareign policy.
Executive powers, however, have not been the only ones modified
by external and internal factors. Contemporary powers of the Legislature
are very different from those intended by the Constitution. In addition to
the Senate's executive powers, the House's appropriation powers, -md
Congress* general legislative md war-making powers, the Legisliture has
acquired extra-Constitutional authority. ' Brookings Institution report con-
siders that the right to conduct Investigstionib- is one of the m<ijor bases
for Congressional pdrticipdtion in the conduct of foreign relations. ^^
10
Blair Bolles, Who Makes Our Foreign Policy ? Headline Series
No. 62 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., March 20, 1947), p. 9.
^^The Biookings Institution, Governmental Mechcinism for the Con-
duct of United States Foreign Reldtion^ , p, 41,
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The Legislature elso exercises power and influence in foreign
relations by means of Congressional resolutions which, although they have
no legsl sanction, reflect and affect public opinion snd Executive action.
Such a resolution was that which the Senate passed that argued against
1ii« admission of Red China into the United Nations.
Related to this power, is that of the influence of actions taken by
individucU members of Congress. A speech by one important legislatOT can
influence both public opinion and the President. Witness those made by
Senator Keating concerning the construction of missile sites in Cuba.
Three final extra-Constitutional legislative powers have emerged.
The first is that through travel and "inspection tours" CongressiCKial com-
mittees and individuals hdve acquired both an influence over the execution
of foreign policy and an expertise in the realm of foreign affairs. The
second is that of members of the Legislature participsting ex-officio as
executive agents, such as at the United Mdtions Charter Conference in
San Francisco. Finally, Congress can exercise powers affecting foreign
policy formulation by legislation determining the structure of the executive
branch.
Here, then. Is the existing governmental distribution of power
for the formulation of American fOTeign policy. What effect this democratic
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VIABIX DEMOOfl^TIC GOVERNMENT AMD EFFECTIVE
FOREIGM POLICY
In his introduction, the writer stated that democracies were at
a disadvantage in the formulation imd execution of effective foreign
policy and that, in the fibsolute, the prerequisites of viable demcx^ratic
government were antithetical to the prerequisites of effective foreign
policy. These antipodal prerequisites are revealed, in differing degrees,
in three aspects of democratic foreign policy formulation.
Firstly, American democracy requires snd guarantees a dUfustoa
of power tlirough the instruments of separation of powers, checks ami
li^lances, and political parties. This diffusion is an intended obstacle
to unity and coordination in the Federal government. The formulation of
effective foreign policy, however, requires unified, coordinated govern-
mental action designed to carry out long-range objectives.
Secondly, American democracy, as a Free and Open Society,
distrusts secrecy and emphasizes popular control over policy-makers
through representation. Max Beloff refers to a "democratic foreign policy"
es one which includes: the avoidance of secret diplomacy; the control of
foreign policy by the Legislature; srKi the direct consultation of the people
on important issues.** Yet, National Survival frequently requires that
much foreign policy be formulated and executed secretly snd swiftly by
the Executive.
12
"Max Beloff, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process
(Bciltimorei Jdins Hopkins Press, 1955), p. S3.
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TliinSly, Amertcun democracy tends to seek mor^l justification
for foreign policy actiCHas • Many Ameartcens think that "moral «xhort3tlon
Is a sufficient diplomatic wev^pon; and they ate still oblivious to the
feet—and it is a fact—that the ultimate arbiter of © difference of opinion is
force," Thus, the moralistic approach to foreign policy tends to divorce
force from dlploms^cy and tends to promote an imbalance between commit-
ments and power. Walter Lippmcinn st.^tes:
Without the controlling principle diet the n-^tion must
maintain its objectives etnd its porver in equilibrium, its
purposes within its means and its means equal to its
purposes, its commitments related to its resources and
its resources >*dequ<iite to its c<:xnmitment8 , it is impossible
to think at all sbout foreign affairs. 14
That these three innate disadvantages in the formulation and
execution of fcNreign policy are the result of American democracy is the
subject matter of the following discussion.
In order to safeguard the individusTs rights and liberties from
encroachment by the state, the Founding Fatihers purposely limited the
powers oi government by the system of separation of powers &nd checks
and bci lances. That these institutional safeguards have a deleterious effect
upon the fcx-mulation of American iaceign policy will now be shov n.
The {problem of formulating coordinated, unified, and effective
foreign policies is manifested in four relationships: Coordin^.tlon within
the executive branchj coordination within the legislative branch; coordina-
tion between the Executive and the Legislature; and coordination betvveen
**Daxter Perkins , The Evolution of /'mericcm Foreign Folicy (New
Y'Xk: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 173,
iV Alter Uppmann, U .S . Foreign Policvi Shield of t^ie Republic











the Government and the people. "' Further, these problems of coordination
can take place on three levels: institutional dlsccnrd, partisan controversies,
and individual, personal animosities between key Individuals
,
Coordination within the executive fcx-anch is made difficult by the
tremendous proliferation of foreign policy functions and responsibilities in
recent years as a result of the widening scope of governmental activities
dnd the international position of the United States. Agencies which
hlstcrically handled for«»ign policy have been reorganized snd enlarged.
New agencies have been created and other agencies have, since World
War n, for the first time, scquired foreign policy functions.
Since a thorough inquiry of foreign policy coordination In the
executive branch would require s study ut least of equal magnitude to this
essay, only the most significant problems rare herein discussed.
The President attempts to coordinate foreign policy among his
departments and Independent agencies through the Executive Office of
the President which Includes the White House Office, the Bureau of the
Budget, the Council of Econc»nic Advisers, the National Security Council,
the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence 'Agency.
He also makes wide use of interdepirtmental committees to effect coordina-
tion*
Outside of the President himself, the most Important executive
institution for the conduct of foreign relations is the Department of State,
headed by the Secretary of State. State Department coordination of fcr-
elgn policies takes plvjce on both institutional and personal levels in
^^The Brookings Institution, Governmental Mechanism for the






tiiree executive-branch relationships: the first is between the Secretary
and the President, which is largely determined by individual personalities.
Whereas J<*in Foster Dulles was given a virtual free rein in the conduct of
foreign relstions. Dean Rusk has sn obvious subordinate role to the in-
cumbent President. The second relationship is between the Department
of State and other executive departments* Whereas State attempts to pro-
vide departmental-level foreign policy cocwdination, its own substantive
interests and activities preclude complete success. The third relationship
is within the Department Itself, between functional and geographic
bureaux , between the Foreign Service Officers and the Civil Service
q?€cidlists, and between those who make policy and those who explain
policy. State Department efficacy in foreign policy, then, is conditional
upon the resoluticm of many diverse factcwrs •
Interntitional and especi^tlly United States concern with security
has resulted in the emergence of the Department of Defense as a vital
institution in the field of foreign relations. In many ways, this emergence
represents a digression from the moralistic approach to foreign policy
which tiie writer intends to criticizie below. It does not, however, com-
pletely remove the basis for that criticism. The Defense Department is
subject to the same divisive e,nd fragmenting general relationships that
plague State. Moreover, the Department of Defense* s intradepdrtmental
coordination is raiide even mare difficult by both the individual and
collective roles played by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Farther
there exists the continuing problem of civil'-military relritions.
Presented here are only two executive departments concerned





tangentiaUy Influential, MeCaray, writing in 1950, counted some 130
subsidiary interagency conunlttees concerned with various phases of
American foreign policy. ^^ The writer contends thdt even the diffusion of
power within the executive branch of government, 'i.nd its resultant Isck of
unity and coordination in the field of foreign relations, is at le&st par-
tially a result of the democratic fear of overcentralization and the tyranny
of one-man rule.
The second major problem is that of the coordinstion within the
LcglsUture* Whereas partisan controversies have only a minor position
in executive coordination, they become, with institutional discord, the
mdjor factors creating legislative disunity and decentralization.
Institutional discord may be further divided into organizational
and procedural factors. One organizational factor: contributing to dis-
unity is the existence of two houses of Congress with dififering res-
f«>nsibilities , reiwesentation, composition, and tenure. A second is thst
of partisan distribution and composition and a third is the reiotionship of
members of Congress to the public.
Procedural factors include problems of coordination and jurisdic-
tion among standing policy committees snd between these stonding policy
committeas and appropriations committees. Two further procedursl factors
contribute to Congressions^i disunity in foreign policy. The first is party
discipline. The reliance pliced by many writers on the benefits of bi-
partisanship in foreign ©ffairs appears, to the writer, to be ci condemnc--
tion of partisan politics "beyond the water's edge," If this is so, then
it is Q rejection cd party discipline in foreign affairs within the
1 (\
James L, McC 'my. The Administration of American Foreign
Affairs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p7 146.






Legislature. Strangely enough, then, members of Congress sre criticized
both for their p^rty solidarity and their political independence. To this
writer, transgression of party platfcMrms is more frequent in the majority
party than in the minority, whidi has -3 tendency toward unity. These
raajOTity transgressions encourage disunity and frsgmentation.
The second and final procedural factor is that of the sectional,
mincMTlty, and particular pressures emanating from a Congressman's con-
stituency. Especially preceding elections is this an important factor in
determining legislative acticm in foreign policy.
These institutional dttid partisan factors create what Cheever and
Haviland call a "Congress bogged down in a morass of complexities without
sufficient discipline, skilled analysis, or coordination to do its job ade-
17
quately" in foreign affairs.
Coordination between the Executive nn<^ the Legislature con-
stitut-v^s t:>iS ^hird raiijor problem area in foreign policy arising from the
system of separation of powers and checks and balances.
Cheever and Havll&nd state thst " , . .under our system of govern-
ment, the executive-legislative relationship is the weakest link in our
18foreign-policy chain." Flnletter, further, claims that this weak relfStion-
ship is endemic!
. . .the American system is so constltutcjd that it produces
a conflict between the Executive and Congress every time
the Executive tiies to be positive and strong* You cannot
17
*' Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Havtland, Jr., <^.merican For*
eign Policy ^mi the Separation of Powers (Cambridge, Massachusetts:










hav« a government capable of handling the most difficult
fMToblems thet peaoe-time democracy h na ever faced with
the two main perls of it at esch other's throats, ~^
Problems of ex:ecutivc-legisl£tlve coordination take place on
tiire© levels. The first of these is institutlonrj discord, resulting from
both formal and Informal internal factors previously discussed. Institu-
tional discord has recently taken on new importance with the growing need
for legislation and appropric tlons to support foreign policy. On his side,
the Executive represents foreign policy formulation d^nd execution through the
Departments of State and Defense. In addition, he controls the data and
intelligence upon which fcx*eign policy must be based. The President,
further, represents the closest approach to unity in the field of fm&ign
affairs. On the other hand, the Legislature holds the purse strings for
foreign policy Implementation '3n6 execution. It has the power to accept
or reject tretities and ^appointments and the power to declare war. Con-
gress through its representative role is the principal instrument of democratic
control over Execnitlve actions in foreign affeirs. Hcivever, as s result of
its representative character, its mechanism for influoncing foreign policies
is highly decentrolized and diversified.
Since the Executive and the Legislature have both independent
and co-jurisdictiondl powers in foreign affairs, discord arises as to which
branch will enjoy leadership, greater influence and control in foreign policy
formulation. The President has an obligation to determine objectives vj'hich
are in the National Interest nnd Congress h xs an obligation to preserve
popular control over vital decisic«is of the Federc-.l government. The lack
of a clear dividing line between the t^ivo invites competition between the
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two branches over foreign policy decisions . Nor can this competition,
and resultant discord, be eilminuted from a democratic government, for
giving the ExG<:;utive power to dlct?»t8 to Congress would result in authori-
terisnlsm r^.nd giving the Legislature power to dicteta to the President would
result in divided s^r^ Impotent government.
In addition to these architectural divisions, a problem of
coordination is raised by partisan controversies. Especially when the
Executive and a mejorlty oi the Legislature are of differing political par-
ties, but even when k President has a majority in Congress, his foreign
policies ere frequently attacked by members of the opposition party hoping
to reap pertls?n benefits.
Finally, foreign policy coordination often suffers as 2 result of
personal animosities between the President and Congressional leaders,
particularly, but not limited to, members of the opposition party.
I^us the institutional, ps«rtisan, ?:md personality barriers to effective
executive-legislative coordination preclude the formulation and execution of
well-integrated, adequately-implemented foreign policies. There is in the
United States government no central authority for the coordination of these
msny diverse influences and powers affecting the formulation and execution
of foreign policy,
A fourth relationship which constitutes an obstacle to the formula-
tion of effective foreign policy is that of cocMrdination between the govern-
ment and the people. A& has been noted, one of the cornerstones of a
democracy is thst governmental policy-makers :;:'.nd their actions must be
subject to popular control, either directly, through elections or indirectly,
through reprGScntation, Moreover, with the improvements in modern com-










A major difficulty emerging in any discussion of the "public" or
•'public opinion" is ^ definition of terms, for " public " in both senses
challenges precise definition. "Public" is considered by some to mean
the aggregate population as a ccMitinuum existing through time. To others,
it implies the polnt-in-time , "men-in'the~street" opinion and to still
others, it is the power elites who actually bring influence to bear on
policy-makers aiwi their actions. To this writer, "public" equals the
total population. In respect to foreign policy, the public is divided intc
two groups: a knowledgeable public -3nd an uninformed public. Kriesburg,
writing about tiie 1946 public, conducted polls which showed that 30% of
the electorate was unaware of any given event in American foreign affairs,
45% was awere but uninformed, and only 25% showed any knowledge at
20
all. Thus the writer's knowledgeable public, upon the basis of those
statistics, would comprise only one-fourth of the electomte. Yet this In-
formed public should be further divided into artlculctte shapers of public
c^inlonwith no personal ajces to grind, such as educstors, commei^etcrs , and
editorial writers and (organized self-interest groups desirous of effecting
personally-beneficial action.
Several generalizations can be made concerning the uninformed
public , with which Llppmann Is concerned when he refers to the "functional
derangement ... between the mass of the people and the government."
^Martin Kriesburg, "D&Tk Areas of Ignorance, " Public Opinion
^nd Foreign Policy , ed. Lester Market (New York: Herper and Brothers,
1349), p. 51.
waiter Llppmann, Essays In the Public Philosophy (New York:
the Mew American library, 195 5), p. IS,
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The uninfcMrmed American public is largely reactive, lethargic, mcMralistic,
and "wants quick results; it will sacrifice tomarrov/' s real benefit for
today's apparent advantage," This is the public most easily swayed by
governmental public relations but it is also the public least-effectively
represented in policy-making.
To this writer, the only public that contributes positively to the
formulation end execution of American foreign policies is that which is
composed of the articulate leaders, hoping to recommend objectives and
policies in the National Interest. Ilie influence of the self-interested
division of the knowledgeable public appears to be most deleterious for not
only is it vociferous and influential but it represents p rticular, minority
interests which have little concern with National Interests . Unfcatunstely,
this self-interested public, through lobbying and conceited actlonp .. is
disproportionately Influential over the formulation and executlmi of American
foreign policies •
Therefore, In the over-all relationship between the government and
the pec^le, the public rejaresents diversified groupings in support of often-
inconsistent objectives ar^ policies, some of which are antithetical to the
pursuit of the National Interests.
Thus, in each of these four relationships (coordination within the
Executive, the Legislature, between Executive and Legislature, cind i^-
tween the government snd the people) Is apparent a lack of unity and con-
certed, coordinated -action to protect and promo4:e the Ncttionai Interests.
^^Hans J. Morgenthau, Politic s A.r.onq Nations (3rd ed.; New
York: flfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 146.
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While this disunity and diffusion of power guarantees the perpetuation of
democratic government, it is a major obstacle to the formulation end execu-
tion of effective foreign policy,
A second prerequisite of American democracy includes the avoidance
of secrecy and the consultation of the people on important issues. These
standards form the basis fear the continued existence of a free and open
society. Yet, although they are prerequisites for a democracy, they ere at
variance with effective foreign policy on two counts . The first is that
whereas
The survival of democracy demands that s,6 much information
as possible be made public; the survival erf the nation may re-
quire tl^t vast quantities of such informcvtion be cldssified as
secret.**^
/although frequently challenged by both the Legislature and the
public in this regard, the Executive, as the source and controller of intelli-
gence, must preserve the secrecy of much information. The reascms for
this preservation are three-fold: first, the specific sources of much in-
telligence inforraation must be protected; second, revesiing all the bases
lex foreign policy formulation Jeopardizes its effectiveness; and, tiiird, the
revelatlcai of information prejudicial to National Security is not ccmipatible
with preservation of the National Interests
.
The consultation of the public on vital issues is at variance
with effective foreign policy primarily in regard to speed and decisiveness.
Many foreign policies, to be effective, cannot endure the discussion and
debate characteristic of public consultation. It c?.nnot wait for public
23
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approval but must be formul ited and executed by governmental offlcijls
hoping to -ct in the National Interests. Of this Dexter Perkins sjys
"
, .the necessities of n> more active and of a more decisive and swlft-
24
dcting diplomacy tend to modify our constitutiondl forms."
Hie third and final prerequisite of American democracy disadvanti
geous to the conduct of effective foreign policies la th-st referred to by
Kenmin when he states:
. . .1 see the most serious fault of our past policy formula-
tion to lie in something thct I might c^ll the leg ilistic-
mcwalistic cipproach to intemstionol problems. *5
As discussed in the section dealing with Amerle sn theoretical
biises of foreign policy formulation, this legsUstic-morilistic approach
wss j result of isolationism, continental insularity, the distrust of and
distaste for European power politics, the belief in indigenous American
superiority, ^nd in the innate goodness of man—that people ^re good
and rulers ire evil. Its primary mcmifeststion in the foreign policy field
has been a divorce between force and diplomacy.
The evolution of the American divorce of power from intem-tionvsl
relations is traced by Spsnier:
Democratic. . .theory posits that man is a rational and morv^l
creature, 3nd that differences among men o^'n be settled by
r-itiondl persuasion and moral exhortation... .Peace—the re-
sult of h&rmony among men—wjs thus the natural or normal
stite.26
•^^Perkins, op. cit. . p. 170.
^George F. Kennan, .American Diplomacy 19U0-1950 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 9b.





Conflict, then, is represented as s deviotion from the norm and
must be a result of immoral states disre^jirding the harmony of interests
among men. A belief in American moral superiority and international immoral-
ity are the results of this thinking. Only when its very existence is
jeopardized should America project her Influence into the international
^rens. The resultant war effort, being based upon universal morcilistic
principles is punitive which ". . .goe** f r to explain the difficulty we hitve
27
in employing force for ritional snd restrictive purposes. ..."
In comporlson with tlie Messianic democratic war effort and the
mutually-exclusive states of conflict and harmony, peacetime foreign poli-
cies fsre expected to preserve the harmony among men, even in dn anarchic
community, unsupported by force and national resources. To quote
Spsnier once again;
The result of this dcprecic-tion of power and morr?listic approach
to foreign policy is the inability of the United States to relate
military power to poUtlcul objectives. Yet, only if the two are
combined can a nation conduct c:n effective foreign policy. 2
8
Here presented, then, are the three dlchotomoua prerequisites
of viable democratic government, on the one ha^nd, and effective foreign
policy on the other. At this stage of the inquiry, the most logical ques-
tion that i reader would ask is how the American experience in democratic
government has been able to exist for almost two hundred years if it em-
braces these intrinsic barriers to the formulation and execution of effec-
tive foreign policy. The criticism is answered by the fact that only in
27,
'Spanier, op. clt. . p. 12





recent years has America been thrust Into the international milieu and
given world-wide responsibilities as a bastion of peace and freedom. As
stated earlier, American external relationships and security were
guaranteed by insul-ir isolation, weak continental neighbors, and the
geographic distance from the historical pivotal point of international
politics. Since the SecoiKi World Wer ^^nd the shift of internationcil power






, . .the goals and methods of policy formation cannot be stated
in terms of efficiency alone, at least in 5 democratic society.
We are committed to the idea that government in some way
ought to reflect the demands of the governed. It is not enough,
in other words, to achieve efficient, intelligent foreign policy
if the price is the destruction of the institutions of democrstic
government. ^^
As e result of the dichotomy between visible democratic govern-
ment and effective foreign policy, a vital question emerges: which is
more important to the United States of America? The writer contends that
democracy should prevail, but the trend appears in the opposite direction.
A recapitulation of those areas in which the two alms come into
conflict will give weight to the allegation that American constitutionsl
democracy is suffering as a result of modifications undertaken to pursue
effective foreign policy.
In order to override the scperation of powers and checks and
balances instituted by the Constitution, the emergency pov/ers of the
Executive have expanded and lost much of their treditionelly temporary
character. As an extension of those powers, the Executive has made
wide use of his power to commit the nation publicly to s course of action
and to deploy the military of the United States without a declaration of
war.
29Jsmes N. Murray, Jr. "Foreign Policy,** Functions and
Policies of An^rican Government , ed. Jack W. Peltason and James M,
Burns (Engiewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 19S8). p. 60,
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In order to annul popular and legislative distaste for secrecy
and a desire for consultation, the Executive has relied upon CP-Type
appropriations, overclassiiication of inform£stion, and what one writer
calls "Crisis Centralizotion." Lasswell elaborates:
Crisis requires rupldlty of decision cjs a means of national
security; rapidity favors centralized final decision; centraliza-
tion favors the exercise of effective power by a self-
perpetuating few. As crisis continues demand for democratic
process grows weaker, and popular government passes into
oligarchy, absolutism, or tyranny. ^^
In order to overcome the legalistic-moralistic approach of
democracy, the Executive has relied upon both crisis centralization and
the universal fears of cultural end biological extinction.
Some have even wondered whether the American democrecy is
congenitaily incapable of currying out susteined and effective
foreign policies in the midst of recurrent international crises,
within a domestic environment of chronic citizen apathy and
lack of understanding of complex external problems. . .Com-
munist policy-makers are unhampered by such potentially
divisive fcctors. . . .They therefore possess an enormous od-
v?intage over the United St ites and other democratic govern-
ments with respect to ability to formulate long-range diplomatic
objectives. .. .^^
The dilemma of whether to preserve democr tic values or effective
foreign policy makes decisions difficult. Without s JiCrificirjg our demo-
cratic values to a form of authoritsriariism, the writer has no solution.
''Harold D. L^sswell, "Politicai Pov/er ^nd Democratic Values,"
Problems of Power in American Democracv , ed. -rthur BuDrni-iStuser (Detroit:
V/ayne State University Press, 1357), p. 58.
^^Crabb, op. cit. , p. 12S.
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